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Abstract
We apply the dynamic s tochas tic framework proposed in the recent evolutionary lite ra ture
to a class of coordination games played s imultaneous ly by the entire popula tion. In these
games , payo¾ s whence best replie s a re de termined by a summary s ta tis tic of the popula tion
s tra tegy pro¿ le . We demons tra te that with s imultaneous play, the equilibrium selection de-
pends crucia lly on how bes t responses to the summary s ta tis tic remain piece -wise cons tant.
In fact, a ll the s trict Nash equilibria in the underlying s tage game can be declared s tochas ti-
ca lly s table depending on how the bes t response mapping genera tes piece -wise cons tant bes t
responses . Furthermore , we show that if the bes t response mapping is suÁ ciently asymmet-
ric, the expected waiting time until the unique s tochastica lly s table s ta te is reached is of the
same order as the muta tion ra te , even in the limit as the popula tion s ize grows to in¿ nity.
Per Svejs trup Hansen
Univers ity of Copenhagen, Department of Economics
Studies traede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
1 Introduction
We apply the dynamic stochas tic framework proposed in Kandori, Maila th and Rob (1993)
(henceforth KMR) to a class of coordina tion games played s imultaneous ly by the entire
popula tion. This is taken to refer to a context where the interaction be tween players are weak
and di¾ use and therefore does not lend themselves to modeling with pa irwise interaction,
anonymous or otherwise .
We choose to model the weak and di¾ use inte raction among agents in such away that
individua l payo¾ s depend on the player's own stra tegy and a summary s ta tis tic of the popu-
la tion's s tra tegy pro¿ le . Speci¿ cally, we assume that each player's s tra tegy space is discre te
and cons is t of - linearly ordered s tra tegies , and, as is often assumed in economic mode ls ,
the s ta tis tic is taken to be the mean of the current s tra tegy dis tribution.
In the class of games studied in this paper players would try to coordinate s ince they
rece ive a s trictly higher payo¾ from playing a stra tegy that matches the current popula tion-
wide mean, than from playing any other s tra tegy. This implis tha t there a re - s trict Nash
equilibria in this class of games . In addition we posit tha t the s tra tegies are tota lly rankable
in the Pare to sense , and tha t coordina ting on a higher va lue of the sta tis tic gives the player
a s trictly higher payo¾ than coordina tion on a lower one .
Note that s ince the re a re more average numbers than s tra tegies , the bes t response map-
ping cannot be one-to-one . Therefore bes t responses are piece-wise cons tant around a given
s tra tegy. One of the contributions of this paper is to demons tra te tha t with simultaneous
play, the determina tion of the s tochastica lly s table s ta tes depends crucia lly on how bes t
responses remain piece-wise cons tant. In fact a ll the strict Nash equilibria in the underlying
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s tage game can be declared s tochas tica lly s table depending on the way piece -wise cons tant
bes t responses are speci¿ ed. This result holds even when we approximate a continuous s tra t-
egy space , i.e . when we by-pass any arti¿ cia l cons idera tions tha t could be associa ted to the
discre teness of the players ' s tra tegy space . Furthermore , we show tha t if piece-wise cons tant
bes t responses are suÁ ciently asymmetric, the unique s tochas tica lly stable sta te cons is ts of
a ll players playing one of the ir extreme s tra tegies (which one depends on the way the asym-
metry goes). In this case the expected waiting time until the unique s tochas tica lly s table
s ta te is reached is of the same order as the muta tion ra te , even in the limit as the popu-
la tion s ize grows to in¿ nity. Hence , unlike in many models of random pairing interaction,
convergence may in fact be very rapid even though the mutation ra te is small.
Our motivation is three fold. Firs t, much research in both traditiona l and evolutionary
game theory has been devoted to discriminate be tween equilibria in games tha t exhibit mul-
tiple s trict Nash equilibria . In coordina tion games many hold the be lie f tha t the Pare to
dominant equilibrium stands out as a focal point, and thus should be selected as the equilib-
rium. Other apply the concept of risk dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Se lten (1988),
as the re¿ nement crite rion. In genera l, the two concepts , Pare to eÁ ciency and risk domi-
nance , di¾ er. However, in symmetric pure coordina tion games they coincide . Kandori and
Rob (1995) show tha t for genera l zz pure coordination games the Pare to eÁ cient equilib-
rium is se lected as the unique stochas tica lly s table s ta te , when players are randomly matched
in pairs . In a recent article Robles (1997) cons iders a model which is s imilar in s tructure
to ours . That is , he s tudies a s imultaneous play coordina tion game that a lso applies the
evolutionary dynamics of KMR. What Robles (1997) shows is that in coordination games
with s imultaneous play and payo¾ s determined by a´veraged s tra tegies ,´the s tochas tica lly
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s table s ta tes are bounded away from the extreme stra tegies , including the Pare to eÁ cient
Nash equilibrium. Apparently, the re is a s tark contras t be tween random pairing and simul-
taneous play. But as we show, the results in Robles (1997) are accounted for by the way he
de¿ nes the piece-wise cons tant bes t response mapping. The Pare to eÁ cient equilibrium may
be se lected as s tochastica lly s table as may any other s trict Nash equilibrium, depending on
de ta ils of the bes t response mapping.
Second, one of the criticisms of the re levance of the concept of s tochastic s tability is tha t
the speed of convergence may be very s low, indeed. The inclusion of a noise te rm meant
to capture for ins tance mutations or trembles , makes all the s trict Nash equilibria occur
with pos itive probability. However, some may be more likely than others . If the long run
probability of a (subset of) s trict Nash equilibria does not vanish as the noise approaches zero,
these s ta tes a re s tochas tica lly s table . The problem is , as pointed out by Ellison (1993) among
others , tha t if the s ta te initia lly is in a non-stochas tica lly s table s ta te , convergence may be
so slow tha t for a ll practica l purposes , the s tochastica lly stable s ta tes a re never reached. In
fact, Binmore , Samuelson and Vaughan (1995) have es timated that going from the payo¾
dominant equilibrium to the risk dominant one in the KMR-mode l, has an expected wait of
d3d(1 periods, when the number of players a re d((, the noise-ra te is dbd((, and the payo¾ s
are such tha t a t least nn of a player's opponents must play the risk dominant equilibrium
stra tegy to induce a switch in the agent in ques tion's bes t reply. Our model which have
fea tures in common with Ellison's (1996) ana lys is of s tep-by-s tep evolution, shows tha t if
piece-wise cons tant bes t responses are suÁ ciently asymmetric, convergence is of the same
order as the mutation ra te even in the limit as the popula tion s ize grows to in¿ nity. Thus ,
another important di¾ erence be tween random pairing and s imultaneous play.
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Thirdly, apart from Robles (1997), the evolutionary lite ra ture has not thoroughly anal-
ysed games with s imultaneous play, even though Crawford (1991, 1997) forcefully a rgues for
introducing genuine s imultaneous interaction into this lite ra ture . What seems re levant in
many mode ls of economic theory, be it of oligopolies , macroeconomic coordination fa ilure
models or models of individua l consumers ' demand for goods such as popular res taurant
sea ts or theater tickets (Becker, 1990), is an inte raction s tructure characterized by s imulta-
neous play ra ther than random pairing, anonymous or othe rwise . In addition, agents react to
some average of othe r agents ' behaviour in these mode ls . Hence , we argue tha t what is re le-
vant for many economic applica tions is a s imultaneous play interaction pattern with a payo¾
structure determined in part by the mean of the current s tra tegy dis tribution. However,
from a game theore tica l pe rspective the equilibrium selection mechanism in these games is
ra ther discomforting, s ince all the s trict Nash equilibria of the underlying s tage game can be
selected as part of the se t of s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes by an appropria te speci¿ cation of the
bes t response mapping. Unless the bes t response mapping genera tes suÁ ciently asymmetric
piece-wise cons tant bes t responses in which case our model has strong predictive power, as
well as fas t convergence to the predicted s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes .
A na tura l ques tion tha t arises is how the bes t response mapping ought to be de¿ ned?
Robles postula tes without any further a rgumenta tion tha t popula tion averages , which lie
between two adjacent discre te s tra tegy choices , should be transformed onto the neares t one of
these s tra tegies . That is , if a value of the average is , say, n3xd the optimal individual s tra tegy
is to play ;, whereas it is to play n if the popula tion average is n3;31 In pure coordination
games , this way of de¿ ning the bes t response mapping does not seem appea ling. In this class
1Robles (1997) breaks tie s such tha t n3x( is mapped onto ;.
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of games, individual payo¾ s are pos itive if the player's choice of s tra tegy equals the summary
s ta tis tic, otherwise individual payo¾ s are zero. The s tra tegies a re a lso tota lly rankable in
the Pare to sense , such tha t coordinating on a higher value of the summary s ta tis tic give the
players a s trictly higher payo¾ than coordina tion on a lower one . We argue that if players
look at the ir payo¾ s, the natura l way of specifying the best response mapping is such that
any popula tion average s lightly above a discre te s tra tegy, ought to lead a player to choose the
next higher s tra tegy. This gives the player a higher payo¾ and involves no greate r risk s ince
both actions a re equally secured.2 These theore tica l arguments sugges t tha t a symmetric
de¿ nition of the bes t response mapping in pure coordina tion games is ques tionable . However,
how individuals a re like ly to perceive wha t is a bes t reply to a given s ta tis tic is an empirica l
matte r. Afte r a ll, the perception of best responses is not a choice variable but intrins ic to
agents .
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 serves for motivation and heuris tics . It
presents the genera l idea by way of a s imple example . Sections 3 and 4 turn the intuition
into formal ana lys is . Section 3 provides the genera l mode l, and section 4 s ta tes a genera l
poss ibility theorem saying tha t, in symmetric coordination games with s imultaneous play and
an average payo¾ structure , any s trict Nash equilibrium can be selected as part of the se t of
s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes by an appropria te de¿ nition of piece-wise cons tant bes t responses .
To illus tra te the theorem, we ca lcula te numerica lly the se t of s tochastica lly s table s ta tes for
a given error ra te and di¾ erent ways of de¿ ning piece-wise constant bes t responses . Section
5 considers the ra te of convergence and s tep-by-s tep evolution, while section 6 discusses the
2A secure action is an action whose lowes t payo¾ is a t leas t as la rge as the lowest payo¾ to any other
fea s ible action. (Van Huyck, Batta lio and Be il, 1991).
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results and sugges ts how the bes t response mapping could be de¿ ned for di¾ erent classes of
coordina tion games.
2 An Example
Consider a s itua tion where a ¿ nite number of players , each having the same ¿ nite se t of
s tra tegies , play a simultaneous coordina tion game. Individua l payo¾ s are de termined by the
player's own action and a popula tion-wide average of the opponent players ' s tra tegy choices .3
For this class of games , we show that any strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying s tage
game can be s tochastica lly stable depending on how the bes t response mapping genera tes
piece-wise cons tant bes t reponses . This will be derived formally in the following sections but
before addressing the theore tica l is sues , we sha ll illus tra te the point by a s imple example .
Cons ide r a symmetric pure coordination game with ] )  players and - ) x linearly
ordered s tra tegies for each of them. Let $wE, D be the payo¾ to an individual playing
s tra tegy E ; \d, 1, n, ;, xi when the mean of the popula tion's current s tra tegy pro¿ le equa ls
 . S ince there a re more average numbers  than s tra tegies E, the bes t response mapping,
4w D, cannot be one-to-one . Speci¿ ca lly, suppose the l´eve l-se t´4dwED ) >Ey, ELdyD
is a ha lf-open interva ll for some cons tant y ; >(, dD. In other words , we de¿ ne an integer-value
function which takes  ; >E y, EL d yD E, such that the best response is piece-wise
3The opponents a re taken in a wide sense , i.e . the player himself ¿ gures among the opponents . If the
playe rs knew they could a lte r the popula tion-wide average by the ir s tra tegy choices , non of the results in
this paper would change in qua lita tive te rms .
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constant a round a given integer-value of E. Hence ,
4w D ) 4wED ) E
whenever E y   c EL d y.
Introducing myopic bes t responses and mutation dynamics as in Kandori and Rob (1995),
we follow Young (1993) in de¿ ning the s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes of the game as those
s ta tes which are the roots of the leas t res is tant paths , where the res is tance in this case is the
minimum number of players who must muta te in order to move from a s ta te where everyone
plays E to a s ta te where everyone plays EI W) E. Denote the minimum res is tance of going
from E to EI by EEI . It has been shown in Kandori and Rob (1995) that only adjacent
s ta tes need to be compared for obta ining the s tochas tica lly s table sta tes in pure coordina tion
games . Thus , we have to compare E,ELd and ELd,E where E ; \d, 333, ;i. Now assume the
integer-function de¿ nes pieces symmetrica lly; tha t is , y ) d
1
. This is the case in Robles (1997)
and as we will demonstra te , the key to unders tand his equilibrium selection mechanism. Set
up the tree as below where the numbers above and below the arrows indica te the res is tances
of going upward and downward, respective ly.
Figure 1, y ) db1
1
1



x
2
1



n
3
n



1
4
x



1
5
It is eas ily seen that s ta te n is s tochas tica lly s table s ince it is eas ier (i.e . requires fewer
mutations) to go from d to 1 than the oppos ite way. Similarly for 1 to n. It a lso involves fewer
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mutations to go from x to ; than from ; to x. The same applies for ; to n. For comparison
assume instead tha t y ) x

. This makes more numbers go up to E than for y ) d
1
. Se tting
up a new tree , we observe tha t the s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes are n and ;.
Figure 2, y ) xb
1
d



n
2
1



n
3
1



1
4
;



1
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This shows that jus t a small change in how the average is transformed onto a stra tegy
choice , s igni¿ cantly a lte rs the equilibrium selection. By changing the pieces s lightly in favour
of going upward, (by increas ing y ; >(, dD), the s tochastica lly s table s ta te(s) a re biased
towards the Pare to eÁ cient outcome. The example sugges ts tha t by an even higher choice
of y ; >(, dD, players would coordinate on the Pare to eÁ cient equilibrium. Similar arguments
apply for tending towards the leas t eÁ cient equilibrium {d}. If the same game is played
with a random pairing interaction s tructure , Kandori and Rob (1995) show tha t the Pare to
eÁ cient equilibrium is stochas tica lly s table . So clearly there is a di¾ erence be tween random
pairing and s imultaneous play, but as the above example illus tra tes , the di¾ erence seems to lie
in how each player's best response remains piece-wise constant in response to other players '
ave raged s tra tegy pro¿ le , and not so much in the di¾ erence in the inte raction structure
per se . The way of de¿ ning piece -wise cons tant bes t responses determines the equilibrium
selection.
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3 The Model
Following Robles (1997), we cons ider a ¿ nite popula tion [ of s ize ] composed of players
z ; [ U) \d, 1, 333, ]i. At each time 0 ) d, 1, 333 these individuals play s imultaneous ly a
symmetric coordination game with linearly ordered s tra tegies E ; & U) \d, 1, 333,-i.4
Individual payo¾ , $wE, wXDD, depends on own action E ; & and the popula tion-wide
mean,  wXDU) d
]

E;&
E’wplayers us ingED , which is observable .5 The (unobservable ) s ta te
X ) wXd, 333, X-D is a vector, whose Eth e lement, XE, represents the number of players us ing
s tra tegy E ; &3 Thus , the s ta te space of the sys tem is chosen equal to -] , where - is the
s tra tegy grid introduced above. We assume that $wE,ED c $wEI,EID whenever E c EI,
and $wE,EID c $wEI,EID whenever E W) EI.
The s tage game described above , exhibits - s trict Nash equilibria in which a ll players
choose the same s tra tegy. In addition, the Nash equilibria a re tota lly ranked in the Pare to
sense ; when all players choose s tra tegy 1 the leas t eÁ cient equilibrium is genera ted, and
Pare to optimum results when every player plays her highes t s tra tegy -3
Like Kandori and Rob (1995) we assume that s tra tegy adjustment is not ins tantaneous
but is subject to some friction. Speci¿ ca lly, it is assumed tha t a t every 0 ) d, 1, 333 each
player takes an independent draw from a Bernoulli tria l. With probability wd  
D ; w(, dD
this draw produces the outcome d´o not lea rn´and the player s tays with her s tra tegy. With
the complementary probability 
 the draw produces the outcome l´earn.´ In this case the
4Schelling (1973) introduced the s imultaneous play model in economics . In biology the term p´laying the
¿ e ld´is used to indica te inte raction with a whole popula tion, (Maynard Smith, 1978).
5Robles (1997) considers games where individua l payo¾ s depend on own action and convex combina tions
of the order s ta tis tics of the popula tion's current s tra tegy con¿ gura tion. It should be noted though tha t the
results in our pape r genera lize , in a qualita tive ly way, to a ll convex combina tions of order s ta tis tics as long
as a ll order s ta tis tics have pos itive we ight.
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player is able to obse rve the average of the popula tion's current s tra tegy pro¿ le and switches
to a bes t response to the period 0 average .6 We assume that she believes her opponents to
s tay with the ir s tra tegies and tha t he r choice has a negligible e¾ ect on the average . Hence ,
he r myopic bes t response is to match the current va lue of the mean.
We assume the exis tence of a partition of the rea l inte rval >d,- H into neighbourhoods
(vicinities ) ~d, 333, ~- of d, 333,- respective ly such that the bes t response
4w D U) s8s-$wN,  D
is cons tant on each ~E, E ) d, 333,- . We shall there fore speak of piece-wise cons tant bes t
responses . For tractability we assume that
~E ) >d,- H  >E y,EL d yD
for some y ; >(, dD. In othe r words ,
4w D ) 4wED ) E
whenever E y   c EL d y.
In addition to the myopic bes t-response dynamics , idiosyncra tic behaviour is modelled
in the following way. For a ll 0, each player z ; [ is subject to some probability  k ( of
m´uta ting,´ in which case the player chooses any s tra tegy E ; & in a pure ly a rbitra rily
6It is without importance tha t the player observes the average and not the s ta te X s ince the payo¾ to the
playe r depends on this ave rage and not on how many players who are playing the di¾ erent s tra tegies .
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manner with pos itive probability on each E ; &. These events , which occur a fter the
bes t-response adjus tments , are assumed to be independent across players and over time .
The compos ition of myopic bes t responses and muta tions genera tes a discre te-time Markov-
process over the ¿ nite s ta te space C, whose trans ition matrix is denoted h wD ) wXXIwDD3
An element XXIwD represents the trans ition probability of moving to s ta te XI at time 0 L d
conditional on be ing in s ta te X at time 0. The m´uta tion-free ´dynamics itse lf corresponds
to h w(D.
The presence of muta tions implies that every transition has positive probability. It is a
s tandard result tha t such Markov cha ins have a unique sta tionary probability dis tribution.
Le t  wD denote the unique invariant dis tribution of h wD for each  k (. The a im is to
characterize the limit
 	 U) j$8
(
 wD.
Based upon arguments in Fre idlin and Wentze ll (1984), Foste r and Young (1990) have shown
that this limit exis ts and they called it the s tochas tica lly s table dis tribution. Call the support
of this limit dis tribution the set of s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes and denote it .
As a ¿ rs t s tep towards computing the se t of s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes we will identify
the se t of the recurrent classes under h w(D. Denote this se t  and le t E be the s ta te where
a ll players play s tra tegy E.
Propos ition 1 Using the arithmetic mean as a summary sta tis tic, the se t of recurrent
classes in the unperturbed game is  ) \\di, \1i, 333, \-ii for any integer-va lue func-
tion {NQy U b  ., de¿ ned by {NQy wD U) {Qy ) F whenever  ; >F  y, F L d  yD, F being
11
an integer and y ; >(, dD3
Proof. If X ) E then  ) E3 There fore 4wED ) E, irrespective ly of {NQy , y ; >(, dD.
Hence , E ; 3 If XI W) E but { wXIDQy ) E, then there a re individuals who do not play a
bes t response to the current s ta te XI. Let a ll those players revise the ir s tra tegy choices . S ince
they will a ll change the ir s tra tegy to E, E is reached in one step. Combined with the fact
tha t E is an absorbing se t this implies that XI is a trans ient s ta te and there fore XI b; 3
In order to de termine  	, we need to know the re la tive s ize of the transition probabilities ,
XXIwD, tha t are converging to zero. S ince mutations are independent across players and
over time, the e lements of h wD are polynomia ls in . In fact, the leading te rms of XXIwD
have the form wX,XID, where wX, XID is the number of muta tions needed to move from X to
XI. Hence , the number of muta tions corresponds to the order (in ) of the corresponding
transition probability. The s tochas tica lly s table sta tes a re precise ly those s ta tes which can
be reached from any other s ta te with the fewes t number of muta tions . In addition, s ince
 w(D is the limit dis tribution of h w(D, it puts zero probability on every trans ient s ta te . We
may therefore res trict a ttention to the recurrent s ta tes to dete rmine the se t of s tochas tica lly
s table s ta tes , .
We now cons ider moving be tween two dis tinct recurrent s ta tes E and EI , E W) EI,
E, EI ;. For each pair of dis tinct recurrent s ta tes E and EI , E W) EI, an mm I-
pa th is a sequence of sta tes  ) wXd, X1, 333, XRD which begins in E and ends in EI for
E W) EI. The res is tance of this path, wD, is the sum of the res is tances of its edges , tha t is
wD )
Rd
>)d wX
d, X>LdD where wX>, X>LdD ; ](  \ i is the number of muta tions required
to move from sta te X> to s ta te X>Ld. Let EEI be the leas t res is tance over a ll EEI-paths .
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In fact,
EEI ) 8$tUXd)E,XR)EI wD3
A tree rooted a t vertex EI (an EI-tree), is a se t of -  d directed edges , each for one
recurrent s ta te , such that from every vertex di¾ erent from EI, there is a unique directed
pa th in the tree to EI. The weight on the directed edge E EI is EEI . The res is tance of a
rooted tree , x , is the sum of the res is tances EEI on the -  d edges that composes it. Let
x wEID be the set of EItrees . Following Young (1993), we de¿ ne the stochas tic potentia l
of the recurrent s ta te EI by
EI ) 8$tx;x wEID
3
wE,EII D;x
EEII
We now sta te the theorem for dete rmining the s tochastica lly s table s ta tes (Young, 1993,
Theorem 4).
Theorem 2 The s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes , E ; , a re exactly the s ta te (s) with minimum
stochastic potentia l.
4 Equilibrium Selection
In this section we characterize the se t of s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes for the average payo¾
games described in section 3. Since the s tochas tic potentia l of E ;  is de¿ ned to be the
minimum resis tance over a ll trees rooted at E, s tandard tree cons tructions determine which
E has the lowes t s tochas tic potentia l.
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When a player z ; [ lea rns , her myopic bes t response is to match the integer-discre tised
mean of the popula tion's current s tra tegy pro¿ le . Hence , to assess the like lihood of a move
from the s ta te E to EI , we need to ¿ nd the minimum number of muta tions required to
change the average from E to EI. S ince large jumps in an individua l s tra tegy change the
average more then small jumps , having players muta te to extreme stra tegies is often the ¿ rs t
s tep along a minimum res is tance pa th. If d  E c EI c _  -, then evidently the re a re
more s tra tegies above E than EI. This means that one mutation to _ has a larger impact
on the average when the s ta te is E, than when the s ta te is EI . Therefore , the number of
muta tions needed to des tabilize equilibrium E upwards must be less than or equal to the
number of muta tions needed to des tabilize equilibrium EI in the same direction. A similar
argument applies to the number of muta tions needed to make the trans ition from a higher
to a lower s ta te .7 Furthermore , a s light modi¿ ca tion of Propos ition 3.2 in Robles (1997),
a llowing for a genera l speci¿ cation of piece-wise cons tant bes t responses , implies tha t to ¿ nd
the minimum res is tance pa th from E we only need to consider adjacent recurrent s ta tes ,
i.e . Ed and ELd. There fore , to ¿ nd the res is tance for the transition E  ELd, we need
to ¿ nd the number of players , de¿ ned as E,ELd, who must muta te to - such tha t the bes t
reply for an E-player, who lea rns , is to play a s tra tegy  ELd3 Hence, E,ELd must sa tis fy
E,ELd
]
- L w]E,ELdD
]
E  E L d  y. Now, de¿ ne E,ELd as the minimum number of
players who must play - for the above express ion to be sa tis¿ ed. Clearly E,ELd depends
on y. In fact, E,ELdwyD U) 8$t
+
E,ELd U E,ELd 
wdyD]
-E

. S imilarly, for the trans ition
ELd  E,we need to ¿ nd the minimum number of players who must muta te to d in order
for an wELdD-player's bes t response to be to play a s tra tegy E, assuming the wELdD-player
7This is what we sta te formally in Lemma 8.
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rece ives a lea rning draw. This is de¿ ned as ELd,EwyD U) 8$t
\
ELd,E U ELd,E k
y]
E

3
For comple teness se t -,-Ld ) d,( ) 38
The following propos ition yie lds a s imple characteriza tion of the res is tance between two
sta tes in .
Propos ition 3 E,ELdwyD ) E,ELdwyD and ELd,EwyD ) ELd,EwyD3
Proof. Appendix.
The next propos ition sta tes the conditions for E to be supported by the stochas tica lly
s table s ta tes . It asserts tha t E is a (pa rt of) the s tochas tica lly stable s ta tes if and only
if more mutations a re required to move the s ta te from E to Ed and from E to ELd
than the other way around. In other words, each inward res is tance must be less than the
corresponding outward one.
Propos ition 4 E ;  i¾ Ed,EwyD  E,EdwyD and ELd,EwyD  E,ELdwyD3
Proof. The proof follows with a s light modi¿ ca tion from Robles (1997, Propos ition 3.2).
From the de¿ nitions of E,ELdwyD and ELd,EwyD it follows tha t the res is tance between
two s ta tes in  depends on how bes t responses are piece -wise cons tant. The next propos ition
gives necessary and suÁ cient conditions for the lowes t and highes t s tra tegies , respective ly,
to be stochas tica lly s table .
8One potentia l problem is tha t it might be poss ible for E,ELd players who muta te to - , to ra ise the
mean above the new s ta te EL d, but not exactly to EL d3 Lemma 3.1 in Robles (1997) shows tha t in tha t
case players can muta te to a s tra tegy _ c - and reach EL d and tha t E,ELd d players is not suÁ cient
to increase the mean to EL d.
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Propos ition 5 Let y ; >(, dD. i) If y ; J(, ]L-d
]-
o
then d ; , ii) if y ;
J
d ]L-d
]-
, d
i
then - ; 3 If in addition ] k -  d and iii) y ;
J
(, ]-Ld
]-
o
then d ;  uniquely, or if
iv) y ; Jd ]-Ld
]-
, d
i
then - ;  unique ly.
Proof. A necessary and suÁ cient condition for - b;  is tha t the number of muta tions
required to move the s ta te from - to -d is s trictly less than the number of muta tions
required to move the s ta te the oppos ite way. This follows from Propos ition 4. In fact, us ing
Proposition 3, and the de¿ nitions of -d,-wyD and -,-dwyD, a necessa ry and suÁ cient
condition for - b;  is y]-d Ld c
wdyD]
-w-dD
. From this express ion it is easy to es tablish ii).
The corresponding argument concerning i) is essentia lly identica l.
To prove uniqueness , a ll tha t is required is that -d,- c -,-d for - to be unique,
and 1,d c d,1 for d to be unique. Then condition iii) and iv) follows from the de¿ nition
of  and .
In Robles (1997), where the integer-va lue function is de¿ ned symmetrica lly, i.e ., y ) d
1
, the
s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes a re bounded away from the extreme stra tegies for most pa rameter
con¿ gura tions . The following corolla ry gives conditions for this to happen.
Corolla ry 6 Let ]  x, -  n and y ) d
1
3 Then i) d b; , ii) - b; 3
Proof. The proof follows from Propos ition 5.
We are now ready to s ta te the main theorem, saying tha t in symmetric coordination
games with s imultaneous play and an average payo¾ structure , a ll the s trict Nash equilibria
of the underlying s tage game can be decleared s tochas tica lly stable by an appropria te choice
of how the popula tion-wide average is transformed into a discre te s tra tegy choice .
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Theorem 7 If ]  x and -  n, any of the recurrent s ta tes E ;  for E ; & can be
selected as s tochas tica lly s table by appropria te choice of y ; >(, dD.
Before we prove the theorem, we need to prove tha t the number of muta tions needed to
des tabilize equilibrium E upwards (downwards) is less (larger) than or equa l to the number
of muta tions needed to destabilize equilibrium ELd in the same direction.
Lemma 8 If d  E c -, then E,ELdwyD  ELd,EL1wyD and EL1,ELdwyD  ELd,EwyD3
Proof. From Propos ition 3 we know tha t the resis tances can be expressed in terms of  's
and  's . Then, we have E,ELdwyD ) 8$t
+
E,ELd U E,ELd 
wdyD]
-E

and
ELd,EL1wyD ) 8$t
+
ELd,EL1 U ELd,EL1 
wdyD]
-wELdD

3 Hence E,ELdwyD  ELd,EL1wyD3
Simila rly, EL1,ELdwyD ) 8$t
\
EL1,ELd U EL1,ELd k
y]
ELd

and
ELd,EwyD ) 8$t
\
ELd,E U ELd,E k
y]
E

3 Therefore , EL1,ELdwyD  ELd,EwyD, and the
Lemma is es tablished.
Proof. (Theorem 7). From Proposition 5 we know that we can select d as a s tochas tica lly
s table s ta te by choos ing y ;
J
(, ]L-d
]-
o
. Call the upper bound of this interva l yd3 kFrom the
same propos ition, - is s tochas tica lly s table when y ;
J
d ]L-d
]-
, d
i
3 Denote the lower
bound of this inte rval y- . It is easy to verify that yd c y- when ]  x, -  n.
Observe that for a ll E U d  E c - , E,ELdwyD is non-increas ing in y ; >(, dD3 This
follows directly from the de¿ nition of E,ELdwyD. In fact, for a given y ) y, a small increase
in y implies a change in E,ELdwyD ; \d, (i, for d  E c - . S imilarly, a small increase in
y implies a change in ELd,EwyD ; \(, di, for d c E - .
17
To se lect any E ;  choose y ; >(, ydH. If E ) d, then d ; 3 If E k d, then choose y
s lightly above yd. As noted above, this increase in y implies a change in E,ELd ; \d, (i and
in ELd,E ; \(, di, and from Lemma 8 it follows that the changes in the resis tances E,ELd
(ELd,E) a re monotonica lly non-decreas ing (non-increasing). If the increase in y changes the
resis tance such tha t the conditions given in Propos ition 4 are sa tis¿ ed, then E ; . If
not, then continue to increase y until they are . If E ) - , then we have to increase y until
y-  y c d3 Note that y- c d for a ll ]  x, -  n3 In fact, j$8
- 
y- ) ]d
]
c d and
j$8
] 
y- ) -d
-
c d3 If E c- , it follows from Lemma 8 that the conditions will be sa tis¿ ed
for y c y- and the proof is comple te .
To illus tra te how the probability dis tribution accumulates on the di¾ erent Nash equilibria
of the underlying s tage game, we can solve for the s ta tionary dis tribution as a function of
the discre tisa tion paramete r y and the muta tion ra te  directly. The results for  ) (3(d
and se lected va lues of y in a game with ] ) x players each having - ) n s tra tegies are
summarized in Table 4.1. (We expla in how probabilities a re calcula ted in the appendix.)
Table 4.1. Long-run probabilitie s
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d 1 n
y ) 
d(
  3E
y ) 
d(
 3;MM 3;
y ) x
d(
 3Ex 
y ) n
d(
3; 3;MM 
y ) d
d(
3E  
A ´´indica tes less than 3(x probability.
5 Rate of Convergence
In this section we argue tha t the way bes t responses to the summary sta tis tic remain piece-
wise constant has important consequences for the expected waiting time required to reach
the s tochas tica lly s table s ta tes . Speci¿ cally it is a rgued tha t if the bes t response mapping
is suÁ ciently asymmetric, i,e .y is close to zero or one , then the expected wait to reach the
s tochas tica lly s table sta tes is re la tive ly short, even if the mutation ra te is small. Moreover,
in the limit when y approaches ze ro or one, the expected wait remains of the same order
as the muta tion ra te even when the popula tion size grows to in¿ nity. Hence , convergence
is fas t a lso in the second sense discussed in Ellison (1993, pp. 1060-1063). This is due to
the fact tha t the system can easily escape the bas in of a ttraction of each Nash equilibrium
except the unique s tochastica lle s table s ta te d or - .
The observation tha t evolution is more rapid when it may proceed via a se ries of small
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s teps between intermedia te recurrent s ta tes is analysed in Ellison (1996). Ellison gives the
following biologica l example to provide intuition: Cons ide r two di¾ erent environments in
which three ma jor genetic muta tions a re necessa ry to produce the more ¿ t animal j from
animal ?. In the ¿ rs t environment each s ingle gene tic muta tion on its own, provides an
increase in ¿ tness tha t a llows the mutants to take over the popula tion. In the second, a ll
three genetic muta tions must occur s imultaneous ly to create the animal with a higher ¿ tness
than ?. If muta tions a re rare phenomena , the expected waiting time to see animal j be ing
crea ted is much larger in the la tte r case . Hence , the large cumulative change from ? to j
seems more plaus ible when gradua l changes are poss ible .
As the ana lys is in section 4 shows, the minimum res is tance paths in coordination games
with s imultaneous play are cons tructed between adjacent recurrent classes . Therefore , evolu-
tionary changes occur s tep-by-s tep. As a result, the expected wait to reach the s tochas tica lly
s table s ta te from any given s ta te in Ellison's s tep-by-s tep model and in the present one is
the same.9
To show that convergence is fas t when the best response mapping is suÁ ciently asym-
metric we follow Ellison (1996) and de¿ ne 8s-X;CP wX,, D as the maximal expected wait
until a s ta te belonging to the se t  is ¿ rs t reached given that play begins in s ta te X ; C
when the mutation ra te is  k (. If the expected wait is small, convergence is fas t and 
can be regarded as a good prediction of play, even in the medium run.
From the de¿ nition of res is tance , i.e . from Proposition 4, it follows that d or - can be
reached via a chain of s ingle muta tions when y is close to ze ro or one. More importantly, this
9Kaarbxe (1998) shows tha t it is easy to construct examples of s imultanous play coordina tion games
where Ellison's ana lys is is not applicable .
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result holds a lso when the popula tion size approaches in¿ nity. As a result, the convergence
ra te is independent of the popula tion size , ] , and convergence is fas t a lso in the second
sense discussed in Ellison (1993).
Propos ition 9 If i) y ; >(, d
]
H or ii) y ; >d  d
]
, dD, 8s-X;CP wX,, D is of order d as
 (3 Moreover, in the limit when y approaches zero or one, this result holds true when the
popula tion size subsequently grows to in¿ nity.
Proof. The proof follows from the de¿ nition of the res is tances . If -d,- ) d we know
that the resis tance of going upward from any other s ta te is a lso one . This follows from the
fact tha t the  's a re non-decreas ing and is proven formally in Lemma 8. Hence - ;  is
reached with jus t one mutation. Correspondingly for case i).
6 Discuss ion
Theorem 7 demons tra tes that in coordination games with s imultaneous play and payo¾ s
de te rmined by a´verage s tra tegies ,´ any of the s trict Nash equilibria of the s tage game
can be s tochas tica lly s table . Which equilibria depend sole ly on the way the best response
mapping transforms the average of othe r players ' s tra tegy pro¿ le onto a discre te s tra tegy.
This implies tha t when di¾ erent game s tructures a re compared, one should be careful in
ascribing di¾ erences in the equilibrium selection to the game as such. What is crucia l is
how bes t responses remain piece -wise cons tant. If for ins tance , piece -wise cons tant bes t
responses are de¿ ned symmetrica lly the s tochas tica lly s table sta tes a re bounded away from
the extreme s tra tegies . This leads Robles (1997) to conclude that the re is a stark contras t
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in equilibrium se lection be tween coordina tion games with random pairing and games with
a s imultaneous play interaction s tructure . He reaches this conclus ion because Kandori and
Rob (1995) show that the s tochas tica lly s table sta te is Pare to eÁ cient in pure coordination
games where players are randomly matched in pairs . However, this is not in contras t to
s imultaneous play, but mere ly a result of the speci¿ c way Robles de¿ nes piece-wise cons tant
bes t responses . It should be noted, though, tha t as the number of players increases , y- ,
i.e . the lower bound on y ; >(, dD tha t makes - ; , goes to one. This indica tes tha t
for a given de¿ nition of piece-wise cons tant bes t responses , it becomes increas ingly diÁ cult
to coordinate on eÁ cient outcomes when the number of players is large . This result ¿ ts
intuition as well as much resea rch (see e .g. KMR, Van Huyck, Ba tta lio and Beil (1990,
1991) and Crawford (1995)).
A natura l question arises though. Namely, how are individuals most like ly to perce ive
y ; >(, dD, and hence their bes t responses? Note tha t this ques tion is not tantamount to
asking how an experimente r would de¿ ne the bes t response mapping. He can choose any
integer value function to his liking (and hence determine payo¾ s), but tha t does not imply
a speci¿ c behaviour of players . Their bes t replie s depend on their perception of what is a
bes t response to a given s ta tis tic. Unfortunate ly, we know of no experiments like the ones in
Van Huyck, Batta lio and Beil (1991) where the payo¾ s (hence bes t replie s ) a re determined
by some averages , tha t could shed light on this issue . Intuitive ly, however, it is diÁ cult to
unders tand why the bes t response mapping should be de¿ ned and percieved as symmetric in
pure coordina tion games. In this class of games , individual payo¾ s are pos itive if the player
match the current average , otherwise individua l payo¾ s are zero. Hence , a ll actions are
equa lly secured (see footnote 1). The s tra tegies are Pare to ranked, such that coordinating
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on a higher value of the summary s ta tis tic gives the players a s trictly higher payo¾ than
coordina ting on a lower one. Thus why should a popula tion-wide average of say, ;3;M, induce
a player to play s tra tegy ; ins tead of x? In particula r s ince playing x gives the player a higher
payo¾ and in addition involves no grea ter risk than playing ;. Though the experiments in
Van Huyck et a l (1991) do not cover this case , some indica tion in favour of this a rgument can
be found in the experiments concerning the median as the payo¾ relevant summary s ta tis tic.
In one trea tment they cons idered a case where a ll disequilibria outcomes give a payo¾ of zero
(the period game ). This resembles our pure coordination game with an average payo¾
structure if the median is inte rpre ted as a proxy for the average . In that experiment, they
¿ nd that everyone playing their highest s tra tegy is like ly to be the equilibrium outcome.
Thus agents may perceive y as close to one even though an experimenter has de¿ ned it
di¾ erently.
It is a lso worth pointing out that pure coordination games are potentia l games, and
Mondere r and Shapley (1996) show that for potentia l games with an average payo¾ structure ,
the unique stra tegy pro¿ le that maximises the potentia l, is the Pare to eÁ cient one . This too,
clea rly lends support to our cla im that for an experimente r an asymmetric way of de¿ ning
the bes t response mapping is not something that should be dismissed. In fact, it actually
accords with theore tica l results as well as empirica l equilibrium observa tions .
For more genera l coordination games we a lso expect tha t if the payo¾ s the players get
when missing the summary s ta tis tic di¾ er for di¾ erent s tra tegies , both de¿ ning and perce iv-
ing the bes t response mapping symmetrica lly is highly unlike ly to be a focal point.
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Appendix
Proof of Propos ition 3. We sha ll show tha t the transition E ELd for d  E c EL
d  - can happen after E,ELdwyDmuta tions and not fewer. The corresponding argument
concerning any trans ition EL d  E for d  E c E L d  - is essentia lly identica l and
omitted.
Firs t, note that a fter E,ELdwyD mutations to -, the bes t response for an E-player, who
learns , is to play s tra tegy ELd.(This follows trivia lly from the de¿ nition of E,ELdwyD)3 Call
the s ta te tha t results if, s tarting a t E, E,ELdwyD players muta te to -, for Xd. Suppose
{ wXdDQy ) EL d3 Since it is assumed tha t a t every 0 ) d, 1, 333 each player enjoys a s trictly
pos itive probability of lea rning, le t a ll players revise their s tra tegy choices . From the bes t-
response dynamics it follows tha t a ll players adjus t to s tra tegy E L d and ELd is reached
with E,ELdwyD mutations . If { wXdDQ k EL d, then there exis ts muta tions to _ c - such
that { wXIDQ ) E L d3 (See footnote 9). Here XI is the s ta te that results if, s ta rting at E,
E,ELdwyD players muta te to _. Again le t a ll players learn. Since 4w wXIDD ) ELd, they a ll
adjus t to ELd3 Hence, E is reached with E,ELdwyD muta tions .
We now show that E,ELdwyDd mutations are not suÁ cient to reach ELd3 Let the s ta te
which results a fte r E,ELdwyD dmutations be X1. From the de¿ nition of E,ELdwyD, it fol-
lows tha t the bes t response for an E-player, who lea rns , is to play E3 Now, le t an --player
rece ive the learning draw. Her best response is by de¿ nition to play E as well. Call the
resulting s ta te after the --player has played her best response for Xn3 Since  wXnD c  wX1D,
ELd is not reachable from E with E,ELdwyD d muta tions .
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Calcula tion of the Sta tionary Dis tribution. The compos ition of myopic bes t responses
and mutations genera tes an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain over the ¿ nite s ta te space
C. We now show how to compute the unique invariant dis tribution,  wD,  k (, for the games
described in this paper.
To s implify the computa tion burden, we assume tha t each player z ; [ enjoys the
probability of revis ing her s tra tegy choice with probability one, i.e . 
 ) d. We re fer to this
as the determinis tic bes t-response dynamics . It is ca lled de te rminis tic s ince every player
switches to a bes t reply in every period.10 Therefore , from any initia l s ta te X, the de termin-
is tic bes t-response dynamics implies a trans ition to the s ta te E, where E ; & is the bes t
reply to  wXD. This transition happens before the mutation dynamics . The probability of the
one-period trans ition X ) w7d, 333, 7E, 333, 7-D  XI ) w7Id, 333, 7IE, 333, 7I-D, is then the probability
of the transition E  XI via the muta tion dynamics , where 4w wXDD ) E.
When a player muta tes , we s imply assume she chooses any stra tegy E ; & with a
time-invariant positive probability which is dis tributed uniformly over a ll poss ible choices .
Hence ,
XXIwD )
3
(7Ew(D7E
7dwEDL333L7- wED)wED)7E7Ew(D
7Ew(DL

EI
7EwEI D)7
I
E
w
7E
7Ew(D
Ww
wED
7dwwEDD, 333, 7-wwEDD
W
wd D7Ew(D
p 
-
QwED
where , 7Ew(D is the number of players playing s tra tegy 7 who do not muta te , wED is the
10 The assumption is not crucia l for the point emphas ized in Table 4.1. Firs t, each playe r's probability
of revis ing her s tra tegy choice can be chosen arbitra rily close to 1. Secondly, the leas t res is tance pa ths are
a lways constructed with trans itions be tween adjacent recurrent se ts . Hence , a ssuming all players learn every
pe riod does not change the number of muta tions in the leas t res is tance paths .
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number of players who play E and mutate ,
D
7E
7Ew(D
i
is the binomial coeÁ cient D 7E
w7E7Ew(DD7E
i
and
D
wED
7dwwEDD,333,7- wwEDD
i
is the multinomial coeÁ cient D wED
7dwwEDD3337- wwEDD
i
.
To illus tra te the above formula , le t - ) n and ] ) x3 In this game there a re 21 s ta tes .
Now assume y ) d
1
, X ) wd, ;, (D and XI ) wd, 1, 1D3 In s ta te X,  ) 
x
and { wXDQ d
1
) 13 Hence ,
4w D ) 1, and 1 is reached via the de te rminis tic bes t-response dynamics . For a given va lue
of , the probability of the transition X XI is then the probability of the trans ition 1  XI
by the mutation dynamics . Hence ,
XXIwD )
w
x
1
Ww
n
d, (, 1
W
wd D1
p
n
Qn
L
w
x
d
Ww
;
d, d, 1
W
wd D
p
n
Q;
L
w
x
d, 1, 1
Wp
n
Qx
) n(wd D1
p
n
Qn
L E(wd D
p
n
Q;
L n(
p
n
Qx
.
When the trans ition matrix, h wD, is ca lcula ted, the s ta tionary dis tribution  wD is found
by power itera tion on h wD until it converges . (See e .g. S tewart (1994) for a sys tematic and
de ta iled trea tment of the numerica l solution of Markov chains .)
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